This paper examines the relation between diversity and long-term economic performance in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers di¤er ex ante in time preference and labour productivity. We show that changing the distribution of these characteristics will a¤ect the steady state by distorting the composition of aggregate labour supply. The exact nature of this e¤ect depends on the shape of the individual labour supply function. Changing the distribution of time preference will also a¤ect the distribution of marginal tax rates across individuals. The aggregate outcome of this is determined by the concavity or convexity of the marginal tax function.
Introduction
Is a more heterogeneous population bene…cial or harmful to long-term economic performance?
What role does redistributive policy, such as progressive taxation, plays in this matter? In this paper, we address these questions in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers di¤er ex ante in time preference and labour productivity. 1 Our analysis focuses on how diversity in these consumer characteristics will a¤ect long-run economic outcomes.
The economic implications of diversity have long been a subject of empirical research. 2 Several recent studies have provided evidence on the positive e¤ect of ethnic and cultural diversity on productivity and economic growth (e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Ager and Brückner, 2013; Trax et al., 2015; Alesina et al., 2016) . 3 In contrast, there have been very few theoretical research on this timely and important issue. This lack is somewhat surprising, given the widespread use of heterogeneous-agent models in macroeconomics. The present study provides the …rst attempt to apply this kind of model to analyse the economic e¤ects of diversity. More speci…cally, we adopt a similar deterministic framework as in Sarte (1997) , Li and Sarte (2004) , Young (2009, 2011) and Angyridis (2015) . In this type of model, ex ante heterogeneity is the root of income and wealth inequality. 4 Progressive taxation comes into play by distorting prices and incentives, which in turn in ‡uences how ex ante heterogeneity translates into ex post economic inequality. The present study adds to this line of research in two ways: First, we examine how changes in the distribution of consumer characteristics will a¤ect the steady state of the model economy. In particular, our model takes into account heterogeneity in both time preference and labour productivity, and their e¤ects are considered separately. 5 This type of analysis has not been previously undertaken. Second, unlike most of the existing studies, we do not con…ne ourselves to speci…c parameterised form of the fundamentals (i.e., utility function, production technology and progressive tax schedule). Instead, most of our results (except those in Section 4.3) are obtained 1 We are agnostic about the origin of these di¤erences, which can be due to racial, cultural, physiological or other reasons. Throughout this paper, we will treat the terms "diversity" and "ex ante heterogeneity" as synonymous. 2 For extensive survey of this literature, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina et al. (2016) . 3 The analysis in Ottaviano and Peri (2006) , Ager and Brückner (2013) and Trax et al. (2015) are based on micro-level data from developed countries, such as Germany and the United States. Alesina et al. (2016) , on the other hand, conduct cross-country comparisons using aggregate level data from 195 countries. Other cross-country studies, such as Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1999) , focus on African countries and …nd a negative relation between ethnic diversity and economic growth. 4 The implicit assumption is that there is perfect consumption insurance so that individuals' choices are not a¤ected by idiosyncratic risks. Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Huggett et al. (2011) argue that predetermined di¤erences in consumer characteristics are more important than idiosyncratic risks in explaining the dispersion in lifetime wealth and lifetime utility. 5 Time preference heterogeneity has been previously considered in Sarte (1997) , Li and Sarte (2001) , Carroll and Young (2011) , Suen (2014) and Angyridis (2015) among others. The empirical evidence on this type of heterogeneity is reviewed in Frederick et al. (2002) . based on some generic properties of these fundamentals.
Our main …ndings can be summarised as follows: In terms of labour productivity heterogeneity, the e¤ects of greater diversity are rather straightforward. When prices are held constant, changing the distribution of labour productivity will only a¤ect the composition of aggregate labour supply.
Individuals' choices, including their labour supply decisions, are a¤ected only indirectly through the general equilibrium e¤ect on wage rate and interest rate. Within this model, we are able to derive a necessary and su¢cient condition under which an increase in labour productivity heterogeneity will lead to an expansion in aggregate labour supply in the steady state. In such a scenario, greater diversity will bene…t the consumers by raising their income and consumption.
The e¤ects of time preference heterogeneity, by contrast, are more intricate due to the presence of two often con ‡icting forces. First, changing the distribution of time preference will a¤ect aggregate economic outcomes by distorting the distribution of marginal tax rates across individuals.
In the context of representative-agent models, the negative relation between marginal tax rate and capital accumulation is well understood: a decrease in marginal tax rate raises the return of savings which in turn promotes capital accumulation. 6 One novelty of the present study is to show that in a heterogeneous-agent economy, changing the composition of the underlying population can in ‡uence the e¤ective marginal tax rate, even when there is no change in the tax schedule per se.
Interestingly, the outcome of this mechanism is determined by the concavity and convexity of the marginal tax function, which is an often overlooked feature of the tax schedule. 7 If the marginal tax function is concave, then a more heterogeneous population will have a lower average marginal tax rate and a higher level of capital accumulation. The opposite is true when it is convex. The intuition of this can be seen by considering the following example: Start with a homogeneous economy in which all consumers are ex ante identical, receive the same amount of before-tax income and face the same progressive tax schedule. Suppose now a mean-preserving dispersion in consumer characteristics is introduced. Such dispersion will lead to a non-degenerate distribution in before-tax income and marginal tax rate. In particular, the relatively poor consumers in the 6 Empirical evidence on this is scant, however, mainly because of the di¢culty in measuring marginal tax rate. For this reason, many studies focus on the relation between average tax rate and economic growth. One exception is Padovano and Galli (2001) which construct country-wide point estimates of e¤ective marginal tax rate for 23 OECD countries over the period and show that this measure is negatively correlated with economic growth. The question of how the distribution or dispersion of marginal tax rates would a¤ect aggregate economic outcomes, however, remains unexplored. 7 If a tax function ( ) is thrice di¤erentiable, then the corresponding marginal tax function is concave (or convex) if and only if the third-order derivative 000 ( ) is negative (or positive). It is important to note that almost all the existing quantitative studies on progressive taxation have adopted a speci…cation which implies a concave marginal tax function (see Section 4.1 for details). But the relation between this and the distribution of marginal tax rates has not been fully explained until now. heterogeneous economy will pay a lower marginal tax rate than in the homogeneous world, and the relatively rich will pay a higher rate. The shape of the marginal tax function matters when it comes to aggregation. If the marginal tax function is concave, then the decrease in marginal tax rate among the poor will outweigh the increase among the rich. As a result, the heterogeneous economy will have a lower average marginal tax rate than the homogeneous economy. 8 Our main results in Section 4.1 generalise this comparison to any two heterogeneous economies which are otherwise identical except for the distribution of time preference. Second, changing this distribution will also a¤ect the formation of aggregate labour supply, as in the case of labour productivity heterogeneity.
When there is no income e¤ect on labour supply, the relation between time preference heterogeneity and aggregate labour depends crucially on the curvature of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour. It remains a challenge to verify whether this type of results will hold when the income e¤ect is operational. In Section 4.3, we provide some numerical examples that can o¤er some insights on this issue.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the baseline model. Section 3 presents the results regarding an increase in labour productivity heterogeneity. Section 4 analyses the e¤ects of greater time preference heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes.
The Baseline Model

Consumers
Time is discrete and denoted by t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g : The economy under study is inhabited by a continuum of in…nitely-lived consumers with di¤erent rate of time preference and labour productivity.
The size of population is constant over time and normalised to one. Let i > 0 be the rate of time preference of the ith consumer, i 2 [0; 1] ; and " i > 0 his labour productivity. Both are predetermined and constant over time. These characteristics are cross-sectionally distributed according to the function H ( ; ") ; which is de…ned over the support ;
["; "] with > > 0 and " > " > 0:
This distribution can be either discrete or continuous (or mixed). The marginal distribution of time preference and labour productivity are denoted by H 1 ( ) and H 2 (") ; respectively.
In each time period, each consumer is endowed with one unit of time which can be divided between work and leisure. Let n i;t and l i;t denote, respectively, the fraction of time spent on work 8 The e¤ects under a convex marginal tax function are similar but in opposite directions. and leisure by the ith consumer at time t: These variables are subject to the following constraints: n i;t 2 [0; 1] ; l i;t 2 [0; 1] ; and n i;t + l i;t = 1:
There is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and investment.
Let c i;t be the consumption of the ith consumer at time t: All consumers have preferences over sequences of consumption and labour hours which can be represented by
where i (1 + i ) 1 is the subjective discount factor of the ith consumer and U ( ) is the (perperiod) utility function. The latter is identical for all consumers and has the following properties.
Assumption A1 The utility function U :
strictly increasing in c, strictly decreasing in n and jointly strictly concave in (c; n) : It also satis…es the conditions: lim c!0 U c (c; n) = 1 for all n 2 [0; 1] and lim n!0 U n (c; n) = 0 for all c 0:
Assumption A2 The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour, denoted by (c; n) U n (c; n) =U c (c; n) ; is non-decreasing in c and strictly increasing in n:
Assumption A2 implies that both consumption and leisure are normal goods. 9 This assumption can be equivalently stated as U (c; n) u (c v (n)) : 10 In both cases, u ( ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, while v ( ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex. For the "no-income-e¤ect" utility, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour is given by (c; n) = v 0 (n), which is independent of c: 9 This means, holding other things constant, an increase in non-wage income in the current period will lead to an increase in current consumption and a decrease in current labour supply. This normality assumption is commonly used in existing studies. See for instance, Nourry (2001) and Datta et al. (2002) . 1 0 The latter is also often referred to as GHH preferences, named after the study by Greenwood et al. (1988) .
Next, we turn to the budget constraint for an individual consumer. Let w t be the wage rate for an e¤ective unit of labour at time t: Then consumer i's labour income at time t is given by w t " i n i;t :
Consumers can save and borrow through a single risk-free asset. Let a i;t denote consumer i's asset holdings at the beginning of time t: The consumer is in debt if this variable takes a negative value.
The interest income (or interest payment) associated with these assets is r t a i;t ; where r t is the interest rate. The sum of labour income and interest income, denoted by y i;t w t " i n i;t + r t a i;t ; is subject to a progressive tax schedule. 11 This is represented by a function ( ) which satis…es the following properties.
Assumption A3 The tax function : R + ! R + is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing with (0) 0: The marginal tax rate is zero at the origin, i.e., 0 (0) = 0; strictly increasing for all y 0 and satis…es lim y!1 0 (y) = 1:
The assumption of an increasing marginal tax rate is often referred to as marginal rate progressivity. This, together with (0) 0; is equivalent to average rate progressivity, i.e., average tax rate (y) =y is increasing in y: A negative value of (0) can be interpreted as a …xed lump-sum transfer from the government. In this case, (y) is the net tax payment for a consumer with taxable income y:
Consumer i's budget constraint at time t is then given by c i;t + a i;t+1 a i;t = y i;t (y i;t ) :
Taking prices and tax schedule as given, each consumer's problem is to choose a sequence of consumption, leisure, labour and asset holdings so as to maximise his lifetime utility in (2), subject to the time-use constraints in (1), the sequential budget constraint in (3) and the initial amount of assets a 0 > 0. 12 There is no other restriction on borrowing except the no-Ponzi-scheme condition, which is implied by the transversality condition stated below. The solution of the consumer's problem is completely characterised by the sequential budget constraint in (3); the Euler equation 1 1 This setup, which is commonly used in the existing studies, implicitly assumes that interests paid on loans are tax deductible. This assumption is adopted mainly for analytical convenience. In most countries, interests paid on personal loans are in general not deductible from taxes. In the United States, for instance, taxpayers can claim deductions on interests paid on student loans and residential mortgages but not on other types of loans (such as credit card debts). 1 2 The current framework can be easily extended to allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth. But since we focus on steady-state analysis, this type of heterogeneity is irrelevant for our results.
for consumption U c (c i;t ; n i;t ) = i U c (c i;t+1 ; n i;t+1 ) 1 + 1 0 (y i;t+1 ) r t+1 ;
the optimality condition for labour supply
which holds with equality if n i;t 2 (0; 1); and the transversality condition
where ' i;t [1 0 (y i;t )] r t is the after-tax return from asset holdings. The condition in (5) takes into account the possibility that a consumer may choose to have zero leisure hours in certain time period, i.e., n i;t = 1 for some t: 13 This happens when the relative price of leisure, i.e.,
; is greater than or equal to the marginal rate of substitution at n i;t = 1; i.e., (c i;t ; 1) :
Production and Government
On the supply side of the economy, there is a large number of identical …rms. In each period, each …rm hires labour and rents physical capital from the competitive factor markets, and produces output using a neoclassical production function: Y t = F (K t ; N t ) ; where Y t denotes output at time t; K t and N t denote capital input and labour input, respectively. The properties of the production function are summarised below.
Assumption A4 The production function F :
strictly increasing and strictly concave in (K; N ) : It also exhibits constant returns to scale (CRTS) in the two inputs and satis…es the Inada conditions.
Since the production function exhibits CRTS in its inputs, we can focus on the pro…t-maximisation problem of a single representative …rm. Let R t be the rental price of physical capital at time t. 1 3 The other corner solution ni;t = 0 can be ruled out by the condition lim
Un (c; n) = 0; for all c 0; stated in Assumption A1.
Then the representative …rm's problem is
and the …rst-order conditions are
Tax revenues collected by the government are entirely spent on "unproductive" government purchases (G t ) : This spending is called unproductive because it has no direct e¤ect on consumers' utility and …rms' production. The government's budget constraint in every period t is given by
for all t 0:
Competitive Equilibrium
Given a progressive tax schedule, a competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of allocations fc i;t ; l i;t ; n i;t ; a i;t g 1 t=0 for each i 2 [0; 1] ; aggregate inputs fK t ; N t g 1 t=0 ; prices fw t ; r t ; R t g 1 t=0 and government spending fG t g 1 t=0 such that (i) Given prices and the tax function, fc i;t ; l i;t ; n i;t ; a i;t g 1 t=0 solves consumer i's problem.
(ii) Given prices, fK t ; N t g 1 t=0 solves the representative …rm's problem in every period.
(iii) The government's budget is balanced in every period.
(iv) All markets clear in every period, so that
We con…ne our attention to the stationary equilibria or steady states of this economy, which can be characterised as follows: For any non-trivial steady state with capital-labour ratio k > 0;
let w (k) and r (k) be the corresponding wage rate and interest rate. To highlight the dependence of individual choices on ( ; ") ; we use y (k; ; ") ; c (k; ; ") ; a (k; ; ") and n (k; ; ") to denote, respectively, the level of before-tax income, consumption, asset holdings and labour of a type-( ; ") consumer in this steady state (the subscript i will be omitted from this point on). These individual-level variables are determined by
c (k; ; ") y (k; ; ") [y (k; ; ")] ;
[c (k; ; ") ; n (k; ; ")] = 0:
Equation (7) is obtained by setting U c (c i;t ; n i;t ) = U c (c i;t+1 ; n i;t+1 ) in the Euler equation of consumption. 14 The intuition of this equation is as follows: In any stationary equilibrium, each consumer has a tendency to perfectly smooth their marginal utility of consumption over time.
To achieve this, the after-tax return from asset holdings must be equated to the consumer's rate of time preference. This has two important implications. Firstly, consumers with the same rate of time preference will face the same marginal tax rate and have the same level of before-tax income, regardless of their labour productivity. In other words, y (k; ; ") is independent of ":
Secondly, for any given in ; ; y (k; ) is a strictly decreasing function in k: This is due to the following mechanism: Holding other things constant, an increase in k will encourage the consumer to substitute future consumption for current consumption by lowering the before-tax return from asset holdings. In order to maintain a constant marginal utility of consumption, it is necessary for the marginal tax rate to fall so that the after-tax return is again equal to : Since 0 ( ) is strictly increasing, this means before-tax income y (k; ) will have to fall after an increase in k: In subsequent discussions, we will refer to this as the intertemporal smoothing e¤ect. Note that this e¤ect arises only when the income tax schedule is nonlinear. 15 Equation (8) is obtained by setting a i;t+1 = a i;t in the sequential budget constraint. This, together with (7) , implies that c (k; ; ") is also independent of ": Equation (9) follows from the de…nition of before-tax income. Equations (10) and (11) are the complementary slackness conditions for labour. In particular, the second inequality in (10) is obtained by substituting (7) into (5). 1 4 Note that equation (7) remains valid even if (i) we allow for ex ante heterogeneity in the utility function, i.e., U i (c; n) 6 = U j (c; n) for some i 6 = j in [0; 1] ; and (ii) there is no disutility from labour, i.e., U (c; n1) = U (c; n2) for all n1 6 = n2 in [0; 1] and for all c 0: 1 5 If the income tax function is linear, i.e., 0 (y) = b for all y 0; then the steady-state value of k is uniquely determined by (1 b ) r (k) = : In this case, only those consumers with the lowest rate of time preference (i.e., the most patient consumers) will hold a strictly positive amount of assets. All other consumers will either have zero wealth (if they are not allowed to borrow) or exhaust the borrowing limit (if an ad hoc borrowing constraint is in place) as in the model of Becker (1980) . Sarte (1997) shows that equation (7) plays a key role in obtaining a nondegenerate steady-state wealth distribution in the presence of time preference heterogeneity. The implications of the intertemporal smoothing e¤ect, however, is less mentioned in the existing literature. Since 0 ( ) is continuous and strictly increasing, its inverse is a single-valued, continuous, strictly increasing function. Using (7) and the de…nition of before-tax income, we can write
Integrating both sides of (12) across all types of consumers yields
where H 1 ( ) is the marginal distribution of ; N (k) is the aggregate labour supply function de…ned by N (k)
and f (k) F (k; 1) is the reduced-form production function. Equation (13) is essentially an accounting identity which states that the sum of all individuals' income equals national income (de…ned as aggregate output minus depreciation of capital). In the sequel, we will refer to Y ( ) as the national income function. A unique, non-trivial steady state exists if (13) has a single, strictly positive solution. The rest of this section is devoted to establishing the existence of a unique, non-trivial steady state.
We begin by specifying the range of plausible values of k: Since ( ) is only de…ned on [0; ] ;
equations (12) and (13) are satis…ed only if
for all 2 ; : In other words, any k that solves (13) must satisfy
To ensure that this range is nonempty, it is necessary to impose the condition > (1 ) : By the strict concavity of f ( ) and the Inada conditions on the production function, there exists a
It follows that any solution of (13) must be contained within the interval [k min ; k max ] : Lemma 1 provides a set of necessary and su¢cient conditions for the existence of a unique steady state.
The proof of this lemma and other theoretical results can be found in the Appendix. A graphical illustration of the unique steady state is provided in Figure 1a . 16 Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 and > (1 ) are satis…ed. Then a unique steady state with capital-labour ratio k 2 (k min ; k max ) exists if and only if
and
In this section we examine how greater heterogeneity in labour productivity will a¤ect the steady state of the baseline model. Our results are based on a comparison between two economies which are otherwise identical except for the marginal distribution of ": To facilitate this comparison, we assume that the two characteristics, and "; are statistically independent in the population so that H ( ; ") = H 1 ( ) H 2 (") for all ( ; ") :
Consider two economies which have the same size of population, utility function u ( ) ; production technology F ( ), progressive tax schedule ( ) and marginal distribution of time preference H 1 ( ) de…ned over ; : 17 The only di¤erence between them lies in the distribution of labour productivity, which are denoted by H 2 (") and e H 2 (") : Both are de…ned over ["; "] and satisfy the assumption below.
Assumption A5 (i) The average value of " is identical under H 2 ( ) and e H 2 ( ). (ii) Conditions (15) and (16) are satis…ed in both economies.
The second part of Assumption A5 ensures that both economies have a unique steady state.
Notice that when k is held constant, changing the distribution of labour productivity will have no e¤ect on the individual-level variables de…ned by (7)- (11) . From (13) , it is evident that the distribution of " will a¤ect the steady-state capital-labour ratio only through the aggregate labour supply function. Intuitively, what this means is that when prices are kept constant, changing the distribution of " will only a¤ect the composition of aggregate labour supply. Individual-level variables are a¤ected only indirectly through the general equilibrium e¤ect on w (k) and r (k) :
Let N ( ) be the aggregate labour supply function de…ned under H 2 ( ) ; i.e.,
for all k 2 [k min ; k max ] ; then the economy with H 2 ( ) will have a higher steady-state capitallabour ratio than the one with e is an interior solution, then it is strictly increasing in ":
The intuition of this result is clear: since more productive workers have a higher opportunity cost of leisure, they tend to work more than less productive ones. This result holds in general when (i) the marginal tax rate on labour income and interest income are identical, and (ii) the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour is strictly increasing in labour.
Both assumptions are satis…ed in most of the existing studies.
Lemma 2 also has the implication that a one-percent increase in " can, in some cases, lead to a greater percentage increase in e¤ective unit of labour, i.e., "n (k; ; ") : Speci…cally, let " 2 = (1 + ) " 1 ; for some > 0; and suppose n (k; ; " 1 ) and n (k; ; " 2 ) are both interior solutions.
Then we have " 2 n (k; ; " 2 ) > (1 + ) " 1 n (k; ; " 1 ) : Thus, in the current setting an endogenous labour supply has the e¤ect of amplifying the variations in labour productivity across consumers.
We now present the main results of this section. 
To explain the main ideas behind this proposition, …rst rewrite N (k) and e N (k) as
where N (k; ") is the average labour supply across all consumers with the same level of "; i.e., N (k; ") Z n (k; ; ") dH 1 ( ) :
We can now interpret N (k) e N (k) as comparing the expected value of "N (k; ") under H 2 ( ) and e H 2 ( ). 18 By Lemma 2, "N (k; ") is a bounded, continuous, starshaped function in " and (17) 1 8 If "N (k; ") is convex in " for any given k 2 [kmin; kmax] ; then N (k) e N (k) if and only if e H2 ( ) is more unequal than H2 ( ) under the Lorenz dominance criterion. The function "N (k; ") ; however, is not convex in general. The details of this point are available from the authors upon request. This is the main reason why we opt for a stronger stochastic ordering, namely the starshaped ordering (de…ned below). is a necessary and su¢cient condition for ranking the expected value of this type of functions. 19 In the statistics literature, this type of ordering is known as the starshaped ordering of probability distributions. A detailed discussion of this type of ordering can be found in Shaked These results can be explained as follows: Holding other factors (especially k) constant, an increase in labour productivity heterogeneity will lead to an expansion in aggregate labour supply.
This lowers the capital-labour ratio which then triggers the aforementioned intertemporal smoothing e¤ect. In particular, before-tax income will increase across all types of consumers, followed by national income and individual consumption. 20 
Heterogeneity in Time Preference
We now examine the steady-state outcomes of greater time preference heterogeneity. Following the same approach as in Section 3, we compare two economies which are otherwise identical except for the marginal distribution of : Throughout this analysis, we will maintain the assumption that and " are statistically independent across the population.
Comparing to the previous section, the task we face here is more complicated due to the 
Exogenous Labour Model
The baseline model can be signi…cantly simpli…ed once we remove the assumption of ‡exible labour In any stationary equilibrium, y (k; ) and c (k; ) are again determined by (7) and (8) but the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (10)-(11) are now superseded by n (k; ; ") = 1; for all (k; ; ") : The steady-state value of k is then determined by
Note that any solution of (19) depends only on the mean value of " but not any other moment.
Thus, there is no loss of generality in assuming that H 2 (") is a degenerate distribution at b ". Using the same line of argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can show that a unique solution of (19) exists if and only if (15) and (16) We now compare two economies which are otherwise identical except for the distribution of , which are denoted by H 1 ( ) and e H 1 ( ) : Both are de…ned over ; and satisfy the assumption below.
Assumption A6 (i) e H 1 ( ) is a mean-preserving spread of H 1 ( ) : (ii) A unique steady state exists in both economies.
The …rst part of Assumption A6 implies that e H 1 ( ) is more dispersed than H 1 ( ) ; and thus represents a more heterogeneous population. Let Y ( ) and e Y ( ) be the national income function de…ned using H 1 ( ) and e H 1 ( ) ; respectively. Similarly, let k and e k be the unique solution of (19) under H 1 ( ) and e H 1 ( ) : Then a more heterogeneous population is said to be bene…cial (or harmful) to long-term capital accumulation if e k k (or e k k ). 21 The main results of this subsection are summarised below.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions A3, A4, A6 and > (1 ) are satis…ed.
(i) If the marginal tax function is concave, then Y (k) e Y (k) for all k 2 (k min ; k max ) and a more heterogeneous population is bene…cial to long-term capital accumulation.
(ii) If the marginal tax function is convex, then Y (k) e Y (k) for all k 2 (k min ; k max ) and a more heterogeneous population is harmful to long-term capital accumulation.
One interesting special case is when H 1 ( ) is also a degenerate distribution, say at some point b
in ; : In this case, we are comparing an identical-agent (IA) economy, in which all consumers are identical, to a heterogeneous-agent (HA) economy, where consumers have di¤erent time preference.
Proposition 5 then implies that the HA economy will have a higher (or lower) level of long-run capital accumulation than the IA economy if the marginal tax function is concave (or convex).
The intuition of these results can be understood by comparing the distribution of marginal tax rates in these two economies.
In the IA economy, all consumers have the same before-tax income y (k ; b ) and face the same marginal tax rate 0 [y (k ; b )] : A mean-preserving spread in the rate of time preference will lead to a dispersion in both of these variables. In particular, it will lower the marginal tax rate for those with greater than b and raise the marginal tax rate for the others. 22 
We conclude this subsection by pointing out the prevalence of concave marginal tax function in the existing literature. Two parametric forms of ( ) are commonly used in quantitative studies.
The …rst one is the isoelastic form adopted by Guo and Lansing (1998) , Li and Sarte (2004) and Angyridis (2015) . This can be expressed as 000 (y) = 00 (y) y a 1 1 (2a 1 + 1) a 2 y a 1 1 + a 2 y a 1 :
In all existing applications, the parameters a 0 , a 1 and a 2 are taken to be strictly positive which ensure that 00 (y) > 0: Gouveia and Strauss (1994) report estimates of a 1 ranging from 0.726 to 0.938 based on U.S. data. From (21) , it is obvious that these values of a 1 imply 000 ( ) < 0; i.e., a strictly concave marginal tax function. In any stationary equilibrium, equations (7)-(9) will remain valid while the optimality condition for labour supply can be simpli…ed to become v 0 [n (k; ; ")] w (k) r (k) " ; (22) with equality holds if n (k; ; ") < 1: It is now straightforward to specify the conditions under which n (k; ; ") is an interior solution for all types of consumers. (ii) If v 0 ( ) is a convex function, then n (k; ; ") is concave in and N (k) e N (k) :
Endogenous Labour Without Income E¤ect
To understand these results, …rst consider the labour supply decision of a single consumer.
Suppose the condition for interior solution is satis…ed. Then optimality is attained when the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour, i.e., v 0 (n) ; equals the after-tax wage rate. The latter is determined by the steady-state capital-labour ratio, as well as the consumer's own characteristics. For the sake of this discussion, we will denote the after-tax wage rate simply as $ and individual labour supply as n ($) : Since v 0 (n) is increasing, individual labour supply is increasing in $; i.e., n ($ 2 ) n ($ 1 ) whenever $ 2 $ 1 : The curvature of v 0 (n) then determines whether a high-wage earner will respond more to the same increase in $ than a low-wage earner.
Speci…cally, if v 0 (n) is concave, then a high-wage earner will have a larger response to the same increase in after-tax wage rate, i.e.,
This is equivalent to saying that individual labour supply is a convex function in $: When comparing across consumers with di¤erent rate of time preference, …rst note that the after-tax wage rate in (22) is linearly increasing in : Thus, consumers with a higher value of will have a higher after-tax wage rate, and by the above reasoning, individual labour supply is a convex function in when v 0 ( ) is concave: 24 A mean-preserving spread in will then lead to an increase in the average value of "n (k; ; ") across all types of consumers, hence N (k) e N (k) for any given k: 25 Based on the results in Propositions 5 and 8, we can identify four possible scenarios depending on the shape of 0 ( ) and v 0 ( ) : Table 1 summarises the overall e¤ects of greater time preference heterogeneity in each of these cases. These e¤ects can be easily seen with the aid of Figure 1a , hence the proof is omitted. For instance, when both 0 ( ) and v 0 ( ) are concave, an increase in time preference heterogeneity will shift both the national income function and the aggregate labour supply function up, according to Propositions 5 and 8. This will lead to an unambiguous increase in national income, but an ambiguous e¤ect on the capital-labour ratio. The latter is due to the presence of two opposing forces: on one hand, an increase in time preference heterogeneity will lower the average marginal tax rate on asset return which is bene…cial to capital accumulation; on the other hand, such an increase will induce an expansion in aggregate labour supply and suppress the capital-labour ratio. Which e¤ect will prevail is a quantitative question. The other three cases in Table 1 can be interpreted in a similar way.
Numerical Examples
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we have identi…ed two mechanisms through which greater heterogeneity in time preference can a¤ect the macroeconomy. The …rst one manifests itself by a¤ecting the crosssectional distribution of marginal tax rates and the national income function, while the second one operates through the aggregate labour supply function. In this subsection, we will use some numerical examples to illustrate the working of these forces in the full version of the baseline model.
There are two speci…c reasons why we resort to quantitative analysis here. First, the presence of income e¤ect poses a serious challenge in characterising the shape of n (k; ; ") as a function in : Without knowing this, we cannot ascertain qualitatively the e¤ect of greater time preference heterogeneity on N ( ) as in Proposition 8. Second, as the results in Table 1 indicate, the overall e¤ects of greater heterogeneity in are often ambiguous due to simultaneous changes in Y ( ) and N ( ) : The use of numerical calculations can help shed some light on these issues.
Consider a parameterised version of the baseline model with the following speci…cs: One period in the model is a year. The consumer's period utility function is given by
where A is a positive-valued parameter and is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The value of A is calibrated so that, on average, consumers spend about one-third of their time on work in the steady state. The resulting value of A is 54.30. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is set to 0.40, which is consistent with the estimates obtained by MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) . The production function is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., F (K; L) = K L 1 ; with = 0:40: We choose the value of so that the steady-state capital-output ratio matches its empirical counterpart in the United States over the period 1953-2009, which is 2.427. 26 This requires = 8:74%: The progressive tax function is assumed to take the form in (20) , with a 1 = 0:768 and a 2 = 0:031: These values are taken from Gouveia and Strauss (1994) . The value of a 0 is calibrated so that the average tax rate, de…ned as the ratio between total tax revenues and total taxable income, is 14.18%. This matches the average tax rate in the United States over the period 1986-2014. 27 The required value of a 0 is 0.323. 28 Under this choice of (a 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ) ; the implied marginal tax function is strictly concave, i.e., 000 ( ) < 0: In terms of consumer characteristics, we assume that both and " are uniformly distributed across consumers with = 0:0571; = 0:0753; " = 1 and " = 100: The implied maximum and minimum value of are 0.946 and 0.930, respectively. Similar range of values of ( ; ") have also appeared in Carroll and Young (2011). 29 The benchmark parameter values are summarised in Table 2 . The resulting value of …ve key variables, namely the capital-output ratio k ; aggregate labour N (k ) ; national income Y (k ) ; aggregate capital k N (k ) and aggregate output (k ) N (k ) ; are reported in Table 3 . 30 The next step is to construct some alternative distributions of with di¤erent degrees of time preference heterogeneity. Intuitively, a mean-preserving spread of the benchmark uniform distribution can be obtained by "hollowing out" the middle section and relocating the mass to the upper and lower ends. To put this in practice, …rst de…ne ; 1 + =3 and We then solve the baseline model under four alternative distributions with 2 f0; 0:5; 0:95; 1:5g ; (20) is given by 0 (y) = a0 h 1 (1 + a2y a 1 ) (1+1=a 1 ) i : As y tends to in…nity, the marginal tax rate becomes a0 in the limit. Hence, we have = a0 = 0:323: 2 9 Unlike Carroll and Young (2011), we do not calibrate the distribution of consumer characteristics to match the empirical distribution of income and wealth. The main purpose of the numerical examples is to demonstrate how changes in the distribution of will a¤ect the functions Y ( ) and N ( ) in the baseline model, rather than to mimic the observed patterns of inequality. For this reason, we opt for the most parsimonious distribution, which is the uniform distribution. One important consideration behind the choice of ; ; "; " is the existence of steady state, i.e., to ensure that the conditions in (15) and (16) are satis…ed. 3 0 The MATLAB codes for generating the reported results are available on the authors' personal website. Figure 2 while keeping all other parameters and the distribution of " unchanged. In general, a lower value of indicates a higher level of heterogeneity. Thus, the distribution with = 1:50 is actually less diverse than the benchmark uniform distribution. Table 3 . Although these results are only suggestive in nature, they do show some interesting patterns. For instance, increasing the dispersion of time preference tends to have a very mild positive e¤ect on k . This suggests that the e¤ect captured by Proposition 5 is slightly stronger than the one described in Proposition 8. The changes in other aggregate variables then largely re ‡ect the changes in N (k ) : In particular, a more dispersed distribution of is associated with a higher level of aggregate labour input. These results also point to an important di¤erence between an exogenous-labour model and a ‡exible-labour model. In the former, an increase in time preference heterogeneity will have no e¤ect on aggregate labour supply but a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on k [due to the upward shift in Y ( )]. In the latter, such an increase will only have a negligible e¤ect on k but a signi…cant positive e¤ect on aggregate labour supply.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the long-run economic e¤ects of diversity in a neoclassical model with ex ante heterogeneous consumers, ‡exible labour supply and progressive taxation. Our results highlight two important channels through which consumer heterogeneity can a¤ect the steady state. First, changing either the distribution of labour productivity or time preference will a¤ect the formation of aggregate labour supply. The exact nature of this e¤ect is determined by the shape of the individual labour supply function, which is often di¢cult to determine qualitatively.
Second, changing the distribution of time preference will have an e¤ect on the distribution of marginal tax rates across individuals. It is shown that the concavity or convexity of the marginal tax function holds the key in determining these e¤ects. In this analysis, we assume that time preference and labour productivity are independent of each other. This assumption is adopted mainly for analytical convenience. As pointed out by Carroll and Young (2009) , such a model may fail to capture the observed patterns of correlation between di¤erent types of income. One possible direction of future research is to analyse the e¤ects of diversity without imposing the independence assumption. The model considered here also does not take into account the political institutions that contribute to the progressive tax system or other redistributive policies. As discussed in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), these institutions play a crucial role in resolving the con ‡icting interests within a diverse population, and this will in turn determine the economic e¤ects of diversity. One exciting and important direction of future research is to introduce some political elements (such as a voting mechanism) into our baseline model and analyse the e¤ects of diversity in a politico-economic equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1
De…ne (k) f (k) k over the interval [k min ; k max ] : Then the steady-state condition in (13) can be more succinctly expressed as Y (k) = (k) N (k) : We will establish some basic properties of each of these functions, starting with ( ) : Since f ( ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, there exists a unique value k GR > 0 such that 0 (k) ? 0 if and only if k 7 k GR : Since 0 (k max ) = f 0 (k max ) = > 0; we have k max < k GR which means ( ) is strictly increasing over [k min ; k max ]
with (k min ) > 0: Next, we turn to the national income function Y ( ) : Since ( ) is strictly increasing, Y ( ) is strictly decreasing on (k min ; k max ) with
Equation (23) follows from the fact that r (k) approaches = (1 ) as k tends to k min : Note that the limiting condition lim then Y (k min ) is in…nitely large and the condition in (16) is automatically satis…ed.
Finally, we will show that the aggregate labour supply function N ( ) is non-decreasing. It su¢ce to show that n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing function in k; for any ( ; ") : Fix ( ; ") and suppose the contrary that 1 n (k 2 ; ; ") > n (k 1 ; ; ") > 0 for some k 1 > k 2 in [k min ; k max ] :
Since c (k; ) is strictly decreasing in k, we have c (k 1 ; ) < c (k 2 ; ) : By Assumption A2, (c; n)
is non-decreasing in c and strictly increasing in n: Hence, we have w (k 2 ) r (k 2 ) " < w (k 1 ) r (k 1 ) " :
The third inequality follows from (10) and the last one uses the facts that w ( ) is strictly increasing and r ( ) is strictly decreasing. The above condition implies that n (k 1 ; ; ") = 1 which contradicts 1 n (k 2 ; ; ") > n (k 1 ; ; ") > 0: Hence, n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing function in k for all possible values of ( ; ") :
In sum, we have shown that [Y (k) (k) N (k)] is strictly decreasing over the interval (k min ; k max ) :
If (15) and (16) are satis…ed, then there exists a unique value k within this range that solves (13) .
Conversely, if this equation has a unique interior solution, then the two curves in Figure 1a must cross once over the interval (k min ; k max ), which implies (15) and (16) . This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
Fix k 2 [k min ; k max ] and 2 ; : Suppose the contrary that 1 n (k; ; " 2 ) > n (k; ; " 1 ) > 0 for some " 1 > " 2 in ["; "] : Since (c; n) is strictly increasing in n, we have
where the second inequality follows from (10). The above condition implies n (k; ; " 1 ) = 1; which contradicts the hypothesis of 1 n (k; ; " 2 ) > n (k; ; " 1 ) > 0. Hence, n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing function in " for all k 2 [k min ; k max ] and for all 2 ; :
If n (k; ; ") is an interior solution, then it is completely characterised [c (k; ) ; n (k; ; ")] = w (k) r (k) ":
By Assumptions A1-A2 and the implicit function theorem, n (k; ; ") is continuously di¤erentiable in ". Straightforward di¤erentiation then yields @ @n @n (k; ; ") @" = w (k) r (k) > 0:
Since @ =@n > 0; the desired result follows. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
We …rst establish an intermediate result. 33 Lemma A1 For any bounded, non-decreasing function g ( ) de…ned on ["; "] ;
Z " " "g (") dH 2 (")
if and only if (17) g (e " i+1;m ) g (e " i;m ) for i = 2; :::; 2 m :
Proof of Proposition 4
Let k and e k be the unique solution of (13) under H 2 ( ) and e H 2 ( ) ; respectively. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, n (k; ; ") is non-decreasing in k for all ( ; ") : Hence, N ( ) and e N ( ) are both non-decreasing functions. Suppose the contrary that k < e k : Then we have Y e k < Y (k ) = (k ) N (k ) < e k N e k e k e N e k :
The …rst inequality uses the fact that Y ( ) is a strictly decreasing function as shown in the proof 
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is built upon the following intermediate result:
Lemma A2 Suppose Assumption A3 is satis…ed. Then ( ) is a convex (or concave) function if and only if 0 ( ) is concave (or convex).
Proof of Lemma A2 Pick any two positive real numbers y 1 and y 2 ; and any 2 (0; 1) : Then 0 ( y 1 + (1 ) y 2 ) ? 0 (y 1 ) + (1 ) 0 (y 2 )
, 0 ( y 1 + (1 ) y 2 ) ? 0 (y 1 ) + (1 ) 0 (y 2 )
, y 1 + (1 ) y 2 ? 0 (y 1 ) + (1 ) 0 (y 2 )
, 0 (y 1 ) + (1 ) 0 (y 2 ) ? 0 (y 1 ) + (1 ) 0 (y 2 ) :
The second line uses the fact that ( ) is strictly increasing. The third and fourth lines follow from the identity [ 0 (y)] = y: Hence, ( ) is a convex (or concave) function if and only if 0 ( ) is concave (or convex). This completes the proof of Lemma A2.
Suppose e H 1 ( ) is a mean-preserving spread of H 1 ( ) and 0 ( ) is convex so that ( ) is concave.
Then we can write
for any k 2 (k min ; k max ) : In other words, changing the distribution of time preference from H 1 ( ) to e H 1 ( ) will shift the Y (k) curve in Figure 1a to the left. Thus, we have e k k : A similar argument can be used to establish the results in part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6
For any q 2 
for all q 2 [0; 1] : for all 2 ; : Pick any 1 and 2 in ; and de…ne = 1 + (1 ) 2 for any 2 (0; 1) :
Suppose v 0 ( ) is concave, then we have v 0 [n (k; ; ")] = w (k) r (k) " = v 0 [n (k; 1 ; ")] + (1 ) v 0 [n (k; 2 ; ")] v 0 [ n (k; 1 ; ") + (1 ) n (k; 2 ; ")] :
Since v 0 ( ) is strictly increasing, the last inequality implies n (k; ; ") is convex in ; i.e., n (k; ; ") n (k; 1 ; ") + (1 ) n (k; 2 ; ") :
A "partial" converse can be obtained by reversing these steps, i.e., if n (k; ; ") is convex in over the entire interval ; ; then v 0 (n) is concave between n k; ; " and n (k; ; ") : This is just a partial converse because the range between n k; ; " and n (k; ; ") may not cover the entire domain of v 0 ( ).
Since convexity is preserved by integration, this means R " " "n (k; ; ") dH 2 (") is also a convex function in : Finally, since e H 1 ( ) is a mean-preserving spread of H 1 ( ) ; we have N (k) 
